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Abstract
This paper proposes a simple model of a mechanism through which exchange rate
can aﬀect the link between output and government spending in zero lower bound (ZLB)
periods. In our proposed model, the expected near-future interest rate is added as an
endogenous variable. Unlike existing AA-DD models in ZLB, the nominal exchange
rate is no longer constant. Our model predicts that the output eﬀect of an increase
in government spending in a ZLB period is deﬂected by an appreciation of the current
exchange rate. The AA-DD model is taught in almost all economic departments. The
model is also generally used by many central banks and governments. The existing AA-
DD model can be misleading. Our new AA-DD model may help to update the existing
model in ZLB periods. Our AA-DD model is also consistent with recent dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models in open economies in ZLB periods.
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1 Introduction
The AA-DD model of Krugman, Obstfeld, & Melitz (2012, page 453) summarises three
markets: the foreign exchange market, the money market, and the market of goods and
services. The main aim of the AA-DD model is to analyse governments' and central banks'
policies using two simple curves. The ﬁrst curve (named the AA curve), which represents the
asset market equilibria, summarises the money market and the foreign exchange markets.
The second curve (the DD curve) represents the goods market equilibria. At the intersection
of the two curves, each of the three markets is in equilibrium (Krugman, Obstfeld, & Melitz,
2012, page 453).
In existing AA-DD models, the ZLB interest rate implies a ﬁxed exchange rate (Krugman
et al., 2012, page 453).1 The ﬁxed exchange rate leads to a larger output eﬀect of an increase
in government spending compared to that in normal periods. Thus, existing AA-DD models
are not consistent with predictions provided by recent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models in open economies. For example, using a DSGE model in open economies,
Mao Takongmo (2017) shows that increases in government spending during the ZLB period
increase aggregate demand, which leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate greater
than that in normal periods. The appreciation of the real exchange rate then deﬂates the
eﬀect of government spending on total production. The AA-DD model is widely taught in
fourth years in economic departments of almost all universities, in part because the intuitions
that drive the results are simple and understandable. The AA-DD model is also used by
many central banks and governments. It is therefore important that the model provide
correct predictions. During the 2007 ﬁnancial crisis and the recession that followed, the
nominal interest rate reached a lower bound and remained at a very low level for a long period
of time (called the zero lower bound [ZLB] period). During the ZLB period, central banks
lost their conventional monetary policy, which consisted of lowering the nominal interest
1The interest parity condition that summarizes the relationship between the output and the nominal
exchange rate, when both the money market and the foreign exchange market are in equilibrium, implies a
ﬁxed exchange rate during ZLB periods.
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rate to increase output. As a result, governments of many countries, including the United
States, started to increase government spending to boost output.2 Using US data, Boskin
(2012) provides empirical evidence that the government spending policy did not work in
the United States. Boskin observes that the increase in debt exceeded the improvement
in total production during the ZLB period. It is important to note that, before observing
data, many policymakers usually base their decisions on the widely taught AA-DD model.
Existing AA-DD model predictions can be misleading and may not be consistent with the
data. Moreover, the AA-DD model predictions are not consistent with the recent DSGE
literature in ZLB in open economies. It is therefore very important to revisit the model in
ZLB periods.
In ZLB periods, agents usually take into account the expected interest rate in the near
future when making their decisions. In this paper, we proposed a theoretical model to allow
the expected interest rate in the near future to be endogenous. Our proposed model no
longer implies a ﬁxed exchange rate and predicts that the output eﬀect of an increase in
government spending is lower than that provided by the existing AA-DD model because of
an appreciation in the exchange rate. This prediction is consistent with the recent DSGE
literature in open economies in ZLB periods (see Mao Takongmo, 2017).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
the resulting government spending multiplier [GSM] in ZLB periods. The classical model,
the classical GSM, and an analytical comparison between our GSM and the classical GSM
in ZLB are presented in section 3. Section 4 focuses on a graphical comparison between the
two results. The ﬁnal section concludes the paper.
2See, for example, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which was designed to increase
US government spending by $831 billion between 2009 and 2019. Another example is the European Economic
Recovery Plan (EERP), meant to increase European government spending by ¿200 billion between 2008 and
2010.
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2 The new model in ZLB
2.1 The new foreign exchange market
Interaction between buyers and sellers of foreign currency bank deposits is assumed to de-
termine the exchange rate in the foreign exchange market. There are two countries: our
country, which uses the U.S. dollar ($), and the rest of the world, which uses the euro (¿).
There are two periods: the current ZLB period, and the medium period. The interest rate
in the current period, rZLB, is assumed to be exogenous and ﬁxed. The interest rate in the
medium period , reM , is endogenous. The nominal interest rates in the current period and
in the medium period abroad, denoted by r∗ZLB and r
e∗ , respectively, are all exogenous.
The nominal exchange rate, E$/¿, is deﬁned as the price of one euro in term of U.S. dollars.
The exchange rate in the current period and in the next period are denoted respectively by
EZLB, and E
e
M . The expected exchange rate is assumed to be exogenous.
Deﬁnition. 1 The foreign exchange market is said to be in equilibrium when deposits in
U.S. dollar and deposits in euro, at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, oﬀer the same expected
value at the end of the second period. The condition for equilibrium in the foreign exchange
market is called the new interest parity condition in ZLB periods.
Proposition 1. The new interest rate parity condition is
reM =
(1 + r∗ZLB)(1 + r
e∗)EeM($/¿)
(1 + rZLB)EZLB($/¿)
− 1 (1)
Proof. The expected value for 1$ deposit, in U.S. dollar, is 1 × (1 + rZLB)(1 + reM) $. The
expected U.S. dollar value of 1$ deposit in euro is
Ee
M($/¿)
EZLB($/¿)
(1 + r∗ZLB)(1 + r
e∗). The foreign
exchange market is in equilibrium if
Ee
M($/¿)
EZLB($/¿)
(1+ r∗ZLB)(1+ r
e∗) = (1+ rZLB)(1+ reM). Thus
the new interest parity condition is reM =
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+r
e∗)Ee
M($/¿)
(1+rZLB)EZLB($/¿)
− 1.
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2.2 The new equilibrium in the money market
Other things being equal, people prefer assets that oﬀer higher expected returns. Since
the current interest rate is ﬁxed at its ZLB value, the expected return increases when the
expected interest rate increases. Since the increases in the expected interest rate represent a
rise in the expected rate of return of less liquid assets relative to the rate of return on money,
agents will want to hold more of their wealth in non-money assets that pay the expected
interest rate and less of their wealth in the form of money, if the expected interest rate rises.
Thus, a rise in the expected interest rate, reM , causes the demand for money, L, to fall.
We also assume that, agents hold money to avoid cost of barter trade (Hicks, 1937;
Mundell, 1963; Baumol, 1952; Rogoﬀ, 1985, for details). The demand for money, L, is then
assumed to be an increasing function of output, Y. Let M s represent the aggregate real
money supply, and P the price level. Equilibrium in the money market is achieved when the
aggregate real money supply, M
s
P
, is equal to the aggregate real money demand. That is
M s
P
= L(rZLB, r
e
M , Y ), (2)
with the assumptions that ∂L
∂r
< 0, ∂L
∂reM
< 0 and ∂L
∂Y
> 0.
2.3 Equilibrium in the good market
The aggregate demand is a sum of consumption demand (C), investment demand (I), gov-
ernment spending demand (G), and net export demand (NX). The consumption demand is
assumed to be an increasing function of disposable income, Y d = Y − T . That is, ∂C
∂Y d
> 0.
We assume that the net export is a function of the real exchange rate.3 We assume that a
depreciation of the domestic currency will lead to an increases of the net export (∂NX
∂E > 0).
4
3In fact, the net export can also be a function of many other variables, such as the national and foreign
disposable income; since our focus in this paper is on the role played by the exchange rate, for simplicity, we
assume that the impact of other factors on the net export is negligible.
4Note that ∂NX∂E > 0 is equivalent to
∂NX
∂E > 0 because in the short run P is ﬁxed by deﬁnition, and P
∗
is exogenous.
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Government spending (G), and taxes (T), are assumed exogenous. For simplicity, invest-
ment (I), is assumed to be a function of the current ZLB interest rate, and is therefore ﬁxed.
By deﬁnition, equilibrium is attained when the aggregated output is equal to the aggregate
demand for goods and services. That is
Y = C(Y − T ) + I(rZLB) +G+NX
(
P ∗
P
E
)
(3)
where P ∗ represent the price index abroad. Assumption A summarises the assumptions
presented in this section
Assumptions A
1. ∂L
∂r
< 0; ∂L
∂reM
< 0 and ∂L
∂Y
> 0.
2. ∂NX
∂E
> 0 ∂C
∂Y d
> 0
Deﬁnition. 2 The new government spending multiplier in ZLB (New GSMZLB), is deﬁned
as the changes in the aggregated output, Y, generated by a change in one unit of government
spending, when the new interest rate parity condition holds, and the market of money, as
well as the market of goods and services, are both in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. The new government spending multiplier in zero lower bound
is equal to
New GSMZLB=
1
1− dC
dY
− dNX
dEZLB
(
( ∂L∂Y )(1+rZLB)E2ZLB(
∂L
∂re
M
)
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+re∗)E
e
M($/¿)
)
Proof. At the equilibrium of all markets, we have, M
s
P
= L(rZLB, r
e
M , Y ), r
e
M =
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+r
e∗)Ee
M($/¿)
(1+rZLB)EZLB($/¿)
− 1 and Y = C(Y − T ) + I(rZLB) +G+NX
(
P ∗
P
E
)
.
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The ﬁrst two equations lead to
M s
P
= L(rZLB,
[
(1 + r∗ZLB)(1 + r
e∗)EeM($/¿)
(1 + rZLB)EZLB($/¿)
− 1
]
, Y ). (4)
Applying the total derivative in both side of the equation 4 lead to dM
s
P
= dL = ∂L
∂r
drZLB +
∂L
∂reM
dreM +
∂L
∂Y
dY . Since dM s = 0, and drZLB = 0, we have
0 =
∂L
∂reM
dreM +
∂L
∂Y
dY. (5)
dreM = −
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+r
e∗)Ee
M($/¿)
(1+rZLB)E
2
ZLB
dEZLB. By replacing dr
e
M in equation 5 we have
dEZLB
dY
=
∂L
∂Y(
∂L
∂reM
)
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+re∗)E
e
M($/¿)
(1+rZLB)E
2
ZLB
. (6)
We also have
Y = C(Y − T ) + I(rZLB) +G+NX
(
P ∗
P
E
)
. (7)
Applying the total derivative in both side of the equation 7 lead to dY = dC+dI+dG+dNX.
Since dI = 0,
dY = dC + dG+ dNX. (8)
Note that dNX = dNX
dEZLB
dEZLB. Thus,
dY = dC + dG+
dNX
dEZLB
dEZLB
1 =
dC
dY
+
dG
dY
+
dNX
dEZLB
dEZLB
dY
(after dividing both side by dY) (9)
Replacing dEZLB
dY
in 9 by its expression in 6 lead to
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1 =
dC
dY
+
dG
dY
+
dNX
dEZLB
 ∂L∂Y(
∂L
∂reM
)
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+re∗)E
e
M($/¿)
(1+rZLB)E
2
ZLB
 .
Thus,
dG
dY
= 1− dC
dY
− dNX
dEZLB
 ∂L∂Y(
∂L
∂reM
)
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+re∗)E
e
M($/¿)
(1+rZLB)E
2
ZLB

1(
dY
dG
) = 1− dC
dY
− dNX
dEZLB
 ∂L∂Y(
∂L
∂reM
)
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+re∗)E
e
M($/¿)
(1+rZLB)E
2
ZLB

dY
dG
=
1
1− dC
dY
− dNX
dEZLB
 ∂L∂Y(
∂L
∂re
M
)
(1+r∗
ZLB
)(1+re∗)Ee
M($/¿)
(1+rZLB)E
2
ZLB

=
1
1− dC
dY
− dNX
dEZLB
(
( ∂L∂Y )(1+rZLB)E2ZLB(
∂L
∂re
M
)
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+re∗)E
e
M($/¿)
) .
This concludes the proof.
3 The classical government spending multiplier in ZLB
3.1 The classical equilibrium in the money market in ZLB
The classical equilibrium in the money market can be written without the expected interest
rate as
8
M s
P
= L(rZLB, Y ). (10)
3.2 The classical interest rate parity in ZLB
The classical interest rate parity is
rZLB = (1 + r
∗
ZLB)
(
EeM($/¿)
EZLB($/¿)
)1/2
− 1. (11)
In fact, the return for a 1$ deposit, in our country is 1× (1+ rZLB)(1+ rZLB) $. The return
for a 1$ deposit abroad is
Ee
M($/¿)
EZLB($/¿)
(1 + r∗ZLB)(1 + r
∗
ZLB) in U.S. dollar unit. The classical
interest rate parity is then
EeM($/¿)
EZLB($/¿)
(1 + r∗ZLB)
2 = (1 + rZLB)
2
or
rZLB = (1 + r
∗
ZLB)
(
EeM($/¿)
EZLB($/¿)
)1/2
− 1. (12)
The interest rate parity in the classical case implies that the nominal exchange rate is ﬁxed
in ZLB periods, since the ZLB nominal interest rate is ﬁxed.
3.3 The classical equilibrium in the good market
In the good market, equilibrium is the same as in the previous section and is
Y = C(Y − T ) + I(rZLB) +G+NX
(
P ∗
P
E
)
(13)
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Deﬁnition. 3 The classical government spending multiplier in ZLB (Classical GSMZLB), is
deﬁned as the changes in the aggregated output, Y, generated by a change in one unit of
government spending, when the classical interest rate parity condition holds, the classical
market of money and the classical market of goods and services are both in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. The classical government spending multiplier is equal to
Classical GSMZLB=
1
1− dC
dY
Proof. The classical interest parity is
rZLB = (1 + r
∗
ZLB)
(
EeM($/¿)
EZLB($/¿)
)1/2
− 1
In the zero lower-bound period, since the interest rate is ﬁxed, the exchange rate should be
ﬁxed. This means that equilibrium in the money market
M s
P
= L(rZLB, Y )
will just guarantee the ﬁxed interest rate. By taking the total diﬀerential in both sides of
the equation 13, we have
dY = dC + dI(rZLB) + dG+ dNX
(
P ∗
P
E
)
= dC + dG (Since exchange rate is ﬁxed), thus
1 =
dC
dY
+
dG
dY
(By dividing by dY)
dG
dY
= 1− dC
dY
,
dY
dG
=
1
1− dC
dY
.
This concludes the proof
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Proposition 4. If assumption A holds, the new government spending multiplier
(NewGSMZLB), will be lower than the classical government spending multiplier (Classical
GSMZLB) in the zero lower bound period, with,
New GSMZLB=
1
1− dC
dY
− dNX
dEZLB
(
( ∂L∂Y )(1+rZLB)E2ZLB(
∂L
∂re
M
)
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+re∗)E
e
M($/¿)
)
and
Classical GSMZLB=
1
1− dC
dY
Proof. By assumption A, ∂L
∂reM
< 0; ∂L
∂Y
> 0; and ∂NX
∂E
> 0.
Thus
dNX
dEZLB
 ( ∂L∂Y ) (1 + rZLB)E2ZLB(
∂L
∂reM
)
(1 + r∗ZLB)(1 + re∗)E
e
M($/¿)
 < 0
and
1− dC
dY
− dNX
dEZLB
 ( ∂L∂Y ) (1 + rZLB)E2ZLB(
∂L
∂reM
)
(1 + r∗ZLB)(1 + re∗)E
e
M($/¿)
 > 1− dC
dY
and
New GSMZLB=
1
1− dC
dY
− dNX
dEZLB
(
( ∂L∂Y )(1+rZLB)E2ZLB(
∂L
∂re
M
)
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+re∗)E
e
M($/¿)
) < 1
1− dC
dY
= Classical GSMZLB.
This concludes the proof.
11
4 Graphical illustration: AA and DD schedule in zero
lower bound
4.1 The market of goods and services: the DD schedule
The DD schedule is the relationship between exchange rates and output at which the output
market is in equilibrium. In this paper the DD schedule is similar to the one proposed by
Krugman, Obstfeld, & Melitz (2012, page 429). The equation representing the DD schedule
is
Y = C(Y − T ) + I(rZLB) +G+NX
(
P ∗
P
E
)
. (14)
An increase of E is associated with and increases of NX and therefore an increases of Y:
the DD curve is upward sloping.
4.2 The asset market : the new AA schedule
The AA schedule is deﬁned as the relationship between exchange rates, EZLB, and output,
Y, at which the market of money and the foreign exchange market are both in equilibrium.
The new equilibrium in the market of money is represented by equation (15), and the
equilibrium in the foreign exchange market is represented by equation (16).
M s
P
= L(rZLB, r
e
M , Y ) (15)
reM =
(1 + r∗ZLB)(1 + r
e∗)EeM
(1 + rZLB)EZLB
− 1 (16)
Proposition 5. The new AA curve, in ZLB is downward sloping. The derivative of EZLB
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respect to Y can be written as
dEZLB
dY
=
∂L
∂Y(
∂L
∂reM
)
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+re∗)E
e
M
(1+rZLB)E
2
ZLB
.
Proof. Replacing reM from equation (16) in the equation (15) leads to
M s
P
= L(rZLB,
[
(1 + r∗ZLB)(1 + r
e∗)EeM($/¿)
(1 + rZLB)EZLB($/¿)
− 1
]
, Y ). (17)
dM s
P
= dL =
∂L
∂r
drZLB +
∂L
∂reM
dreM +
∂L
∂Y
dY.
Money supply is ﬁxed, thus, dM s = 0. Interest rate is ﬁxed, thus, drZLB = 0, and
0 =
∂L
∂reM
dreM +
∂L
∂Y
dY. (18)
Applying the derivative of reM respect to EZLB using equation (16) lead to
dreM
dEZLB
= −(1 + r
∗
ZLB)(1 + r
e∗)EeM($/¿)
(1 + rZLB)E2ZLB
or
dreM = −
(1 + r∗ZLB)(1 + r
e∗)EeM($/¿)
(1 + rZLB)E2ZLB
dEZLB.
Equation 18 becomes 0 = − ∂L
∂reM
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+r
e∗)Ee
M($/¿)
(1+rZLB)E
2
ZLB
dEZLB +
∂L
∂Y
dY
dEZLB
dY
=
∂L
∂Y(
∂L
∂reM
)
(1+r∗ZLB)(1+re∗)E
e
M
(1+rZLB)E
2
ZLB
. (19)
∂L
∂Y
> 0 and ∂L
∂reM
< 0 by assumption A. Additional to that, all other variables are positive.
Equation (19) shows that dEZLB
dY
< 0. Thus the new AA curve, in ZLB, is downward sloping.
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4.3 The classical asset market : the old AA schedule
In the previous section we derived equation (20) and (21) that represent respectively the
classical equilibrium in the money market and in the foreign exchange market. The old AA
schedule is deﬁned as the relationship between the exchange rate, EZLB, and output in which
equations (20) and (21) both hold. Recall that in equation (20) money supply will just be
adjusted in other to maintain the ﬁxed interest rate. In other words, the central bank loosens
its monetary policy, in the classical framework.
M s
P
= L(rZLB, Y ). (20)
rZLB = (1 + r
∗
ZLB)
(
EeM($/¿)
EZLB($/¿)
)1/2
− 1 (21)
The interest rate parity in the classical case (equation 21) implied that the nominal exchange
rate is ﬁxed in zero lower-bound periods. This is due to the fact that in the zero lower-bound
period, the nominal interest rate is ﬁxed. Recall that by assumption, the expected exchange
rate is exogenous.
4.4 Graphical illustration: the old vs the new government spending
multiplier
The classical model is represented in panel (a) and the new model is displayed in panel (b)
of ﬁgure 1.5 Each equilibrium is observed when the AA and the DD curves cross each other.
The classical AA curve in ZLB is a horizontal line, while the new AA curve is downward-
sloping. An increase in government spending shifts the DD schedule to the right by dG
1−MPC
5Note that increases in exchange rate is a depreciation of the national currency.
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(MPC = dC
dY
). In the classical analysis, (panel a), the DD curve shifts from DD1 to DD2
and the equilibrium output moves from Y1 to Y2. dY = Y2 − Y1 = dG1−MPC .
In the new model (panel b), the DD curve shifts from DDn1 to DDn2 and output moves
from Yn1 to Yn2. The increases in output are less than those observed in the classical analysis.
dYn = Yn2 − Yn1 = dG
1− dC
dY
− dNX
dEZLB
 ( ∂L∂Y )(1+rZLB)E2ZLB(
∂L
∂re
M
)
(1+r∗
ZLB
)(1+re∗)Ee
M($/¿)

15
5 Conclusion
In ZLB periods, the existing AA-DD model proposed by Krugman, Obstfeld, & Melitz (2012)
predicts a very large output eﬀect of an increase in government spending compared to that in
a normal period. We propose a simple model in which the expected near-future interest rate
is endogenous. In our new model, the output eﬀect of an increase in government spending in
the ZLB period is deﬂected by an appreciation in the current exchange rate. The predictions
of our new AA-DD model are consistent with recent DSGE literature in open economies
in ZLB periods. The AA-DD model is widely taught in many universities. The AA-DD
model is also used by many policymakers. Our new AA-DD model will help to update the
existing AA-DD model in ZLB periods. Our new model will also help central bankers and
governments when building their policies, especially when they do not have access to data.
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Figure 1: Eﬀect of Government spending on output in zero lower-bound: comparing the new
eﬀect with the classical eﬀect
(a)  A Classical AA-DD Equilibrium in Zero Lower Bound 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
    
 
(b) A  New AA-DD Equilibrium in Zero Lower Bound 
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Note: The classical model is represented in panel (a) and the new model is displayed in panel (b). In panel (a), an increase in
Government spending shifts the DD schedule to the right from DD1 to DD2 and equilibrium output moves from Y1 to Y2.
In panel (b), the DD curve shifts from DDn1 to DDn2 and output moves from Yn1 to Yn2, with dYn < dY.
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